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Abstract 
Whether to hire teachers locally on a contract basis, or via competitive examinations as 
government officials, is a major policy question in developing countries. We use a Discrete 
Choice Experiment to assess the job preferences of 700 future elementary school teachers in 
the state of Uttarakhand in India. The students have been selected using either competitive 
examination or from a pool of locally hired contract teachers. Skills in English, Arithmetic 
and Vocabulary are also tested. We find a trade-off between skills and preferences, as 
students hired using competitive examination have higher skills, but prefer posts in less 
remote regions. 
 
Keywords: Discrete choice experiment, education, para-teachers, preferences, skills 
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1 Introduction 
Improvements  in  health  and  education  are  of  primary  importance  in  enabling  people  to 
overcome poverty.  However,  there  are  great  difficulties  in  providing good quality  public 
services in remote areas in developing countries. One key problem relates to attracting and 
retaining  educated  personnel  in  these  difficult  locations.  Various  approaches  have  been 
experimented with to motivate qualified key personnel to work in remote locations (see e.g. 
WHO, 2006). 
In India, recruitment decisions of teachers have traditionally been made at the state 
level and teachers have been recruited as civil servants on permanent contracts. However, the 
practice has been criticised for producing unmotivated teachers with little incentives, often 
absent as they choose to commute to their rural workplace from far (Sharma, 1999). In an 
important study, Kremer et al. (2005) find that in their sample of Indian primary schools, 25% 
of the teachers were absent during unannounced visits. According to Ramachandran  et al. 
(2005), the state of Rajasthan alone lacked 50,000 primary school teachers. Rural areas can 
lack  amenities  that  urban-educated  teachers  are  used  to.  Multi-grade  teaching,  with  one 
classroom and one teacher shared by all pupils, is also common. 
In response to teacher absences and shortages, like many developing countries, Indian 
states  have turned to  recruiting  untrained,  temporary contract  teachers,  who are generally 
local  to  rural  areas  at  low salaries.  Despite  generally  being labelled  as  ‘temporary’,  such 
“para-teachers” have become a common and persistent feature in primary schools in many 
Indian states. Para-teachers may be recruited to fill a vacant position, or enable a school to be 
established in an under-served area (under the Education Guarantee Scheme1).  The hiring 
practices and pay of para-teachers vary by state and some states rely more heavily on para-
teachers than others.2 
        Concerns  have  been raised  regarding the  quality  of  para-teachers  as  well  as  the 
acceptability  of  their  low  pay  (PROBE 1999,  Pandey  and  Raj  Rani  2003,  Govinda  and 
1    http://education.nic.in/edu_guarantee.asp
2   The statistics from the District Information System for Education (DISE) for government-run primary schools 
for 2008 show that the highest share of para-teachers (54%) is in Jharkand, followed by Uttar Pradesh (40%). To 
name a few other states, the share in Andhra Pradesh is 11%, 9% in Uttarakhand, 3% in Kerala and negligible in 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. These figures have been calculated by authors from the school-level DISE database 
(see Appendix 1). It must be noted that the definition of a para-teacher can vary by state depending on their  
recruitment policies.
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Josephine 2004). Regular teachers fear that the arrangement undermines the trained teacher 
profession. But, there is also a growing demand among para-teachers for access to training 
and recognition as regular teachers. Several states have experienced legal cases on this front 
(see  e.g.  Kingdon  and  Sipahimalani-Rao,  2010).  Some  states,  such  as  Uttarakhand  and 
Punjab,  have  started  to  accept  para-teachers  to  training  programmes  to  enable  them  to 
continue as teachers. 
         Rigorous evaluations on the effectiveness of para-teachers in India, or elsewhere, are 
still  scarce.  The  limited  evidence  available  suggests  that  despite  lower  pay,  or  lack  of 
qualifications,  para-teachers  perform  no  worse  than  regular  teachers  in  India  and  may 
outperform them (see Atherton and Kingdon, 2010, Goyal and Pandey, 2009, Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman, 2010). Studies on contract teachers in other developing countries produce 
somewhat more mixed results (see e.g. Bourdon, Frölich and Michaelowa, 2010, de Laat and 
Vegas, 2005 and Duflo et al., 2009).
         A standard explanation offered for any potential difference in performance relates to 
the nature of the contract;  namely that with a renewable contract,  para-teachers are under 
stricter pressure to perform than those with a permanent contract. However, this may not be 
the  only  explanation.  Atherton  and Kingdon (2010) suggest  that  the  low salaries  paid  to 
contract teachers as opposed to regular teachers attract individuals who are more intrinsically 
motivated towards teaching children in government schools and less socially distanced from 
the  children.  So far  the  studies  on  the  differences  between  contract  teachers  and regular 
teachers have not provided clear explanations on why performance may differ. 
This study sheds more light on the potential differences between para-teachers and 
permanent  teachers,  and  their  work  motivation,  by  providing  measurements  of  two  key 
dimensions, which typically remain unobservable to researchers; job preferences and skills of 
teachers. As far as we know, this is the first study that jointly provides evidence on these 
variables in the context of public sector teachers in developing countries. The main focus is 
the potential trade-off between skills and preferences to work in rural, or remote, locations, 
that may accompany the recruitment of local para-teachers. 
This study relies on a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to measure the preferences 
of teachers. In DCEs, the indirect utility function of respondents is estimated from repeated 
choices of designed bundles of goods, or services, that are presented to them. This is to our 
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knowledge the first study to analyse job preferences of teachers with a DCE, although the 
methodology has been used to study preferences of health workers. The DCE in this study 
focuses on the nature of the employment contract and pays particular attention to preferences 
over geographical location. 
The study utilises the DCE to analyse the preferences of differently selected public 
sector  workers  at  the  training  stage.  The  teacher  students  were  presented  with  pairs  of 
contracts from which they were asked to select the contracts they prefer. A Logit model is 
then used to examine how the preferences of former para-teachers differ from those of the 
competitively selected students and how personal characteristics affect preferences. 
The teacher selection process in Uttarakhand, India, provides a unique opportunity to 
survey former para-teachers and competitively selected teacher students on the same training 
programme. The sample consists of approximately 700 respondents.  All respondents were 
also asked to complete  a simple skills  test  consisting of knowledge of countries,  English 
vocabulary, and arithmetic. There is little systematic evidence on teachers' skills in India so 
far (with the exception of Banerji and Kingdon, 2010). 
         The DCE reveals significant differences in the job preferences of the two groups of 
teachers. In particular, para-teachers are less averse to working in remote locations than the 
“standard”, competitively selected students, and para-teachers do not value district capitals as 
locations  of  employment.  Para-teachers  are  also  indifferent  on  whether  contracts  involve 
rotation  as  long  as  they  are  permanent,  whereas  the  standard  students  strictly  prefer 
permanent contracts without rotation. Interestingly, para-teachers also prefer larger class size. 
Some of the difference in preferences can be explained by life-cycle factors such as teaching 
experience and having children. In that regard, it is possible that the preferences of standard 
students will converge somewhat towards those of para-teachers, as the standard students set 
up families and gain more experience.
          The study also finds significant differences in general skills between the two groups. 
Standard students obtain higher scores in all sub-tests, in particular in arithmetic. The overall 
conclusion is that individuals who choose to work in rural areas as para-teachers may be more 
content with the types of jobs available on average in the Indian public sector primary schools 
than those who enter through competitive examinations. However, a trade-off exists between 
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the job preferences and general skills. 
         The article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the key literature and Section 3 
describes the background to primary education and teacher training in India and Uttarakhand. 
Section 4 discusses the data and reports on the descriptive statistics and general perceptions of 
both types of students. Section 5 presents the details of the Discrete Choice Experiment used 
in the study. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 report the results and discuss robustness checks, and 
Section 8 concludes. 
2 Background literature
Recent  evaluation  studies  on  teacher  contracts  in  developing  countries  have  focused  on 
incentive mechanisms to motivate teachers and monitoring mechanisms to reduce absences 
(see e.g. Duflo et al. 2010, Glewwe et al. 2010, Kingdon and Teal, 2007, Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman, 2011, Banerjee  et al. 2010). Another recent strand of literature focuses on 
hiring practices, in particular on the effects of the recruitment of local contract teachers. The 
latter is more relevant for our study and key results are presented below. This is followed by a 
brief discussion on studies using Discrete Choice Experiments to analyse job preferences.
         Regarding absence rates  of  teachers,  a  study by Kremer  et  al.  (2005) found no 
statistically  significant  difference  in  the  absence  rates  of  regular  teachers  and  contract 
teachers. On the other hand, Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao (2010) show that the absence 
rates of para-teachers were half of those of permanent teachers in the state of Uttar Pradesh, 
but that there was no difference in Bihar. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010) report that 
in a sample of teachers in Andhra Pradesh, contract teachers were less likely to be absent than 
regular teachers. 
 To date,  there are  only a  few studies  that  rigorously assess  the effect  of teacher 
contracts on actual pupil outcomes in India. Atherton and Kingdon (2010) use child-specific 
data for 4000 government school pupils in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. With school fixed effects 
models, they find that students taught by para-teachers perform better, controlling for child 
and  teacher-characteristics.  Their  results  also  indicate  that  some  of  the  difference  in 
performance may arise from contract teachers having a more beneficial impact on socially 
disadvantaged students.  
 With  a  cross-sectional  survey  of  public  primary  schools  in  the  state  of  Andhra 
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Pradesh, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010) find that a randomly added contract teacher 
improves pupil test scores. In a non-experimental regression part of their analysis, the authors 
find that contract teachers are no less effective than regular teachers. A study by Goyal and 
Pandey (2009) uses teacher-specific cross-sectional data for 200 government primary schools 
in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. They find that,  within schools, para-teachers exert 
higher  effort  than  permanent  teachers,  but  that  effort  diminishes  over  time,  suggesting  a 
weakening of incentives. Higher effort in general is associated with better test scores. The 
limited evidence available therefore suggests that despite lower pay, or lack of qualifications, 
para-teachers may outperform regular teachers in India.
A  few  studies  on  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  present  somewhat  more  mixed 
findings. Bourdon, Frölich and Michaelowa (2010) find that contract teachers reduce learning 
inequalities among students. A study using student-level data for Togo by de Laat and Vegas 
(2005)  on  the  other  hand  finds  that  regular  teachers  outperform  contract  teachers.  An 
experimental study by Duflo et al. (2009) for Kenyan schools shows that students taught by 
an additional, randomly assigned contract teacher have higher test scores.    
        By studying  how para-teachers  and “standard”  students  differ  in  their  skills  and 
preferences over job contracts, this study suggests some explanations for differences in the 
effectiveness of the two types of teachers. This connects our research to a literature on the job 
preferences of public sector workers. For instance, some previous studies on health workers in 
developing countries have found that individuals from more remote areas are in general more 
willing to return to work in such areas (see e.g. Chomitz et al., 1998, Serneels et al., 2005 and 
2010 and Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaibon, 2003). However, studies have not yet highlighted 
this in the context of the discussion on para-teachers. 
In order to assess how much teachers prefer different contract features, some form of a 
contingent  valuation  (or  'willingness-to-pay')  method  is  required.  This  study  relies  on  a 
Discrete  Choice  Experiment  (DCE).  Traditional  contingent  valuation  methods  have  been 
criticised,  for  instance  by  Diamond  and  Hausman  (1994)  as  being  a  “deeply  flawed 
methodology”, with many potential sources of inconsistency. Since then, DCEs have gained 
popularity  in  Health  Economics,  Environmental  Economics  and Marketing  for  measuring 
preferences  over  various  products  or  services.  In  DCEs,  the  indirect  utility  function  of 
respondents is estimated from repeated choices of designed bundles of goods or services that 
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are presented to them. A brief survey of the method, and how it has improved elicitation of 
preferences, is provided by Hanley, Mourato and Wright (2001). In short, Discrete Choice 
Experiments are better suited to address multidimensional trade-offs and are more informative 
as each respondent makes multiple choices. Since the valuations are indirectly inferred from 
choices and the individuals choose options that represent a bundle of characteristics, there 
may be less scope for strategic responses.
        The application of DCEs to analyse human resource policy questions is recent, but  
expanding.3 Their  use in this  field has so far  been limited  to  health  workers.  In a recent 
review, Lagarde and Blaauw (2009) identify nine existing studies that assess how DCEs have 
contributed to the study of health worker preferences. Since then, a few more have appeared. 
For  a  few studies  in  the  context  of  developing  countries,  see  e.g.  Chomitz  et  al. 
(1998), Penn-Kekana  et al. (2005), Hanson and Jack (2010), Mangham and Hanson (2008) 
and Kolstad (2011). The studies have tended to focus on the role of pecuniary versus non-
pecuniary (working conditions, training) characteristics of the contract and paid less attention 
to the nature of the contract. Location choice has been a general component in these studies, 
as several have focused on the problem of attracting workers to rural locations. However, the 
location options may not have been very specific, often a binary urban/rural choice. In our 
study,  the  DCE  focuses  on  the  nature  of  the  contract  and  pays  particular  attention  to 
preferences over location by including four location categories.
       In order to analyse the potential trade-off between preferences and skills, all students  
were also asked to complete a simple skills test. There is still little systematic evidence on 
teachers' skills in India. One exception is the SchoolTELLS survey, which measured teaching 
skills  and  revealed  significant  gaps,  especially  in  the  knowledge  of  Mathematics  among 
public sector primary school teachers in 2007-08 in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (see Banerji and 
Kingdon, 2010). Our test measured general/subject knowledge and not teaching skills as such. 
It is recognised that the two do not necessarily coincide. However, general knowledge and 
subject skills can still matter. For example, recent evidence by Metzler and Woessman (2010) 
from Peruvian primary schools shows that  one standard deviation increase in  teacher  test 
scores in subject knowledge raises student test scores by 10 percent of a standard deviation. 
3 A recent surge of articles using DCEs for Human Resources questions in Health Economics is reviewed by 
Guttman, Castle and Fiebig (2009). DCEs have gained interest in this context given the absence of data sets on 
actual choices that public sector workers have made regarding their jobs in developing countries. 
7
3 Primary education and teacher recruitment in India and Uttarakhand
The Annual  Status of Education  Report4 is  currently possibly the most  reliable  source of 
nation-wide performance data on primary school students in India. According to the 2009 
report,  on  average  64  per  cent  of  school  children  in  rural  India  within  classes  3-5  have 
elementary reading skills, but there is great state level variation. The figure in the state of 
Uttar Pradesh is 48%, whilst that in Himachal Pradesh is 82% and in Madhya Pradesh 88%. 
The state of Uttarakhand has been a somewhat above average performer, with 74% of pupils 
in classes 3-5 with elementary reading skills in the 2009 ASER survey. There is however 
considerable within state variation in Uttarakhand as shown in Table 1 below. The districts in 
bold are covered by our survey.
Table 1 Percentage of primary school students with elementary skills in Uttarakhand
Source: Annual Status of Education Report (2009). Ordered by “reading” score. The data are collected at the 
household level, so pupils in both public and private schools are included. Districts in bold are covered by our  
survey.
In  Uttarakhand,  training  for  public  sector  primary  school  teachers  is  provided 
exclusively by public sector training institutes, the District Institutes for Educational Research 
and Training (DIETs). The State Council for Educational Research and Training (SCERT) 
oversees the DIETs. The DIETs organise both full-scale teacher training programmes as well 
4 http://www.asercentre.org/
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District Grades 3-5
Maths English
Pithoragarh 90.3 84.4 23.8
Nainital 86.8 76.3 23.1
Champawat 84.6 67.4 36.7
Almora 82.6 79.8 20.9
Chamoli 77.6 68.2 10.5
Garhwal 77.4 66.8 19.9
Rudraprayag 73.1 56.7 14.5
Tehri Garhwal 72 53.2 28.9
Uttarkashi 69.2 46.9 19.2
Bageshwar 66.1 57.8 10.5
Dehradun 64.1 50.8 28.6
Haridwar 64 53.4 33.8
Udham Singh Nagar 58.3 41.6 20.6
Reading
as shorter training courses for existing teachers and inspectors. A new two-year programme, 
the  Basic  Teaching  Certificate  (BTC)  was  initiated  in  April  2010.5 The  BTC training  is 
required to be able to work as a regular teacher in a public sector primary school. There are a 
total of 13 DIETs in Uttarakhand, of which 3 are so called “mini-DIETs”, given that they are 
located in districts with a smaller number of schools. 
Uttarakhand formed part of the state of Uttar Pradesh until 2000. In the 2001 Census, 
the state is reported to have 8.5 million inhabitants, and 90% of the population depends on 
agriculture.6 The state is relatively small geographically in comparison to many other Indian 
states, but its territory consists mainly of mountains. Travel times can be long even between 
short distances, and therefore remote locations pose a clear challenge for teacher recruitment. 
Para-teachers have been used to staff schools in Uttarakhand, in particular in rural and 
more remote locations. In this case, these teachers have generally had the characteristics of 
standard  “contract  teachers”:  they  do  not  have  formal  teaching  qualifications  and  are 
employed on a contract basis with significantly lower salaries than those of regular teachers.7 
However, the government has recently decided to end the recruitment of para-teachers and 
offer BTC training for the existing para-teachers to enable them to become regular teachers. 
The current starting salary of a regular teacher in Uttarakhand has recently been raised to 
approximately Rs. 17,000 per month. A “cost of living” allowance as well as “a hill area” 
allowance  are provided in  some circumstances,  and a  “housing allowance”  if  appropriate 
government accommodation is unavailable.8 The starting salary is considerably higher than in 
some other states, although there have been recent increases elsewhere as well following the 
recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission (see e.g. Kingdon, 2010). However, recent 
discussions suggest that the state of Punjab for instance still  pays only approximately Rs. 
5000-6000 for its  regular public sector teachers.9 In Uttarakhand, para-teachers have been 
paid up to Rs. 6000 per month in recent years.
5 There has been a ten-year break in the provision of regular training programmes. (see Godiyal and  Nautiyal, 
2008).
6 http://www.india.gv.in/knowindia/st_uttaranchal.php
7 The combination of a lack of formal qualifications,  and the temporary nature of the contract  may not be 
characteristic of all “para-teachers” in India. According to Ramachandran (2009) “In some states such as Kerala, 
for example, a few ‘contract’ teachers have  been appointed, supposedly as a purely temporary and stopgap 
measure. At the other end of the spectrum, Madhya Pradesh had [...] decided to discontinue the appointment of  
regular teachers [...]. In between these extremes, we find Maharashtra, where all new primary level teachers are  
appointed on a three-year contract and with a low honorarium, even though their qualifications are the same as 
‘regular’ primary teachers; after three years, they are eligible for appointment as ‘regular’ teachers.” 
8 Source: Communication with officials at Uttarakhand Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan office.
9 Source: Communication with officials in the SCERT in Punjab.
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There are currently approximately 200 students in each DIET10 on the new training 
programme, of which roughly half are former para-teachers. Almost all students in the district 
specific DIETs come from the same district. They will also be recruited as teachers in the 
same district. 
The former para-teachers were selected to the programme at the village level. The 
number of years of teaching experience appears to have been one decisive factor for their 
selection, but there are other less well-defined criteria as well. The “standard” students were 
selected on the basis of a composite  entry score. This is based on the performance in an 
entrance exam as well as other merits (such as existing degrees, education) or quota-related 
characteristics, but the female-male ratio should be 50:50 (see Godiyal and Nautiyal, 2008). 
We were  reported  that  upon completion  of  the  programme,  the  former  para-teachers  are 
supposed to be sent back to their  original  location,  and the others will  be sent to a rural  
location for 10 years. The choice of initial location can be based on merit and success in the 
BTC programme, but this is a murky area. 11
Regular  teachers  can  generally  request  for  transfers  of  location,  or  are  at  times 
transferred without request, and this is another controversial issue in India. In a summary of 
her research,  Béteille (2009) explains how half of the teachers she surveyed in the states of 
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka agreed that transfers require connections and 30 
percent believed that they would have to pay to obtain the post they wanted. Ramachandran et  
al.  (2005) report that in their survey, the share of teachers explicitly wanting a transfer was 
not  large.  However,  mass  transfers  occurred  now and  then.  In  2005,  the  government  in 
Rajasthan transferred 20,000 teachers in one occasion, which generated general unrest. To 
quote the authors:
“Discussions with trade union leaders  revealed that  transfers and posting were big 
business in Rajasthan. Intensive lobbying followed bulk transfers and it was rumoured that 
political middlemen demanded Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 25,000 to cancel the transfer or ensure a good 
posting.” 
10 The numbers are smaller (roughly 100) in the “mini” DIETs.
11  Source: Communication with various education officials in Uttarakhand.
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
The survey was carried out in DIETs in seven out of 13 districts of Uttarakhand. The state of 
Uttarakhand was chosen for its manageable size, but also the introduction of a new teacher-
training programme, including both former para-teachers and competitively selected students. 
The survey was conducted in May 2010, right after the students (both standard students and 
former para-teachers) had entered the BTC programme.
Since  the  students  had  only  recently  entered  the  training  programme,  it  can  be 
assumed that the programme itself had not yet significantly shaped their skills or preferences. 
Thus, it provides a picture of para-teachers “as they are” and standard students in the first 
stage of their career. One distinguishing factor between the two groups of students is that 
para-teachers have more teaching experience. However, compared to the existing studies on 
para versus permanent teachers already working in schools, there is rather little difference in 
the mean age between the two groups. The study captures all teachers at an entry point to 
their careers as regular public sector teachers. Although the selection process of both para and 
normal teachers may vary somewhat across states, it is reasonable to expect that the results 
are relevant to other Indian states.  
The main criteria for the choice of districts were diversity in geography and diversity 
in pupil outcomes (as seen above in Table 1). It was considered appropriate to sample two 
geographically “flat” districts (Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar) where conditions resemble 
those of other Northern Indian States. In addition, the district including the state capital was 
included (Dehradun).  Out  of the remaining four sampled districts,  two can be considered 
remote  mountain  districts  (Chamoli  and Rudraprayag)  and two less  remote,  mountainous 
districts (Almora and Nainital). More details of the data collection process are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
The questionnaire given to the participants consisted of three parts. Part I focused on 
the general background of the students and their perceptions on the recruitment and work of 
teachers. This was followed by the discrete choice experiment (part II) and a timed, voluntary 
general skills test (part III). The questions in the survey and job characteristics incorporated in 
the  DCE were  decided  after  discussions  with  a  range  of  Indian  education  officials  and 
academics, including officials in the state of Uttarakhand. The design was also influenced by 
findings in existing literature referred to above. A vast majority of the students had at least 
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some teaching experience, and thus the presented choices should not be alien to them. The 
questionnaire as well as verbal instructions were given in both English and Hindi (the main 
language in the state). This section reports on the responses to part I as well as the results of 
the skills tests. The replies to the DCE are described in Section 5.
4.1 Profile of students
A total of 707 students participated in the survey of whom 39% said they entered the BTC 
programme  as  para-teachers.  Table  2  summarises  the  data  on  the  background  and 
characteristics  of  the  students  separately  for  the  former  para-teachers  and  the  standard 
students. There are some significant differences. 
Whereas 61% of the standard students come from rural areas, 97% of the former para-
teachers  say  they  come from rural  areas.  Para-teachers  are  also  much  more  likely  to  be 
married and have on average more children. The average age of a para-teacher is 33 years, 
and that of a standard student is 29 years. The parents of para-teachers are less educated and 
come from homes with fewer possessions on average,  with the exception of land. Former 
para-teachers have on average 8.2 years of teaching experience, while standard students have 
an average of 1.7 years of teaching experience, in the latter case typically from the private 
sector. Approximately half of the standard students have worked as a teacher in the private 
sector, whereas the corresponding figure is 15% for the para-teachers. The wage that para-
teachers had earned as private sector teachers was less than half of the wage earner by the 
standard students. This is likely to be explained by location, but potentially also differences in 
skills. Almost everyone who had worked as a para-teacher reported a current standard salary 
of 6000 Rs. per month. Some noted that the standard salary had initially been lower, around 
Rs. 2500 per month. There are no striking differences between the religion or caste status of 
the former para-teachers and the standard students (not reported in the table). Almost all of 
the students are hindus and in both student categories, about 40% belong to a scheduled caste 
or tribe, or other backward caste.
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Table 2 Summary statistics  
Notes: * dummy variable, 1 = less than primary school (1), primary school (2), secondary school (3), higher 
secondary school (4),  university degree (5). 2 = years of experience in private or public sector school. A total of 
707 individuals, selection status is unknown for 3 students. ~ First normalised principal component of the three 
skill measures. 1 USD ~ 45 Rupees. ** significant at the 1% level.
The  competition  for  places  on  the  BTC  programme  is  considered  fierce  for  the 
standard students. The surveyed students all already hold at least a bachelor level degree. In 
terms of education, 80% of the standard students hold a Masters degree, while 57% of the 
para-teachers hold a Masters degree. India-wide statistics show that on average para-teachers 
have higher educational qualifications than permanent teachers, but this is likely to be due to 
the fact that para-teachers are on average younger than permanent teachers currently teaching 
in schools. Despite the relatively high stated levels of education, 34% of those in the sample 
say they  would  be  studying  for  another  degree  had they  not  been accepted  to  the  BTC. 
Attractive work is scarce and the teaching profession desirable. 
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Standard students Para-teachers
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Difference  
Female* 425 .52 .50 277 .50 .50 0.02
Birth year 413 1981 3.0 251 1978 3.6 3.60 **
Married* 424 .47 .50 276 .89 .31 -0.42 **
# Children 425 .52 .80 277 1.74 1.07 -1.22 **
405 3.70 1.22 249 2.72 1.25 0.98 **
411 2.45 1.30 252 1.64 .87 0.81 **
Parents own:  
     House* 426 .91 .29 278 .72 .45 0.19 **
     Car* 426 .10 .30 278 .04 .20 0.06 **
     Land* 426 .55 .50 278 .68 .47 -0.13 **
     Computer* 426 .28 .45 278 .05 .23 0.23 **
402 1.73 2.25 257 8.18 2.32 -6.45 **
Private school experience* 415 .55 .50 267 .16 .37 0.39 **
Monthly private pay (Rs.) 228 4165 3423 41 2011 2657 2154 **
MSc Degree* 424 .80 .40 276 .55 .50 0.25 **
Rural* 421 .61 .49 271 .97 .16 -0.36 **
Skills test:  
     Countries (#) 425 16.89 4.43 278 14.72 4.01 2.17 **
     Arithmetic (#) 422 30.01 7.96 273 24.13 8.44 5.88 **
     English (#) 424 10.87 3.67 277 8.54 3.60 2.33 **
421 .29 .92 272 -.45 .95 0.74 **
Father’s Education1
Mother’s Education1
Teaching Experience2
Skills -  1st PC~
4.2 Skills  
The surveyed students were asked to participate in a voluntary timed test of simple generic 
skills,  which  focused  on  knowledge  of  countries,  English,  and  Arithmetic.  A  detailed 
description of the tests and their first principal component can be found in Appendix 2. The 
test was not designed to test whether teachers’ skills matched the expected level of those of 
relevant  students,  but moreover  to demonstrate  a general  level  of knowledge in the three 
areas. The average scores obtained by the two groups are shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 
below shows the distributions of the test scores across the two groups. This is a general skills 
test not designed to specifically test for teaching skills. As mentioned above, teachers’ subject 
knowledge can affect  learning,  but teaching skills  evidently also depend on various other 
factors, overall motivation potentially being a very important one.
Figure 1 Differences in skills between para-teachers and standard students: Kernel 
densities
Notes: Solid line: standard students, dashed line: para-teachers.
14
Overall, there are significant differences between the groups in all tests. The differences are 
particularly large in the arithmetic test. The mode for standard students in the arithmetic test 
is 35 (out of 40 problems) and that for para-teachers is 20 (out of 40 problems). It is difficult  
to determine what represents a “good” score in the arithmetic test for primary school teachers, 
but based on the responses it was apparent that students who scored below 20 were struggling 
with arithmetic computations – either by making many mistakes or by running out of time. 
Some students did well with addition and subtraction, but were discouraged by multiplication 
or division. The full test can be found in Appendix 2.
5 Discrete choice experiment: econometric model
In the experiment, all students were presented with pairs of contracts from which they had to 
select the one they prefer. These represented hypothetical contracts with characteristics that 
were deemed to be generally important and relevant for a teacher’s job. To elicit a sufficient 
amount of information regarding their preferences over the characteristics (attributes) of the 
contracts,  the  selection  was  repeated  multiple  times  with  different  levels  of  the  contract 
attributes.  In  our  case,  the  number  of  contract  pairs  was  12  (see  Appendix  3  for  a 
justification).  The contract  attributes  and their  levels  are  presented  in  Table 3 below. An 
example contract pair is presented in Appendix 3. This section of the questionnaire was not 
timed; the students were given the amount of time they required to complete the section. All 
students received the same contract pairs to choose from.
The students were explained that this was an independent study and that all responses 
would remain confidential and would not be revealed to education officials, or  members of 
staff at the school.  The aim was to minimise the tendency to provide “correct” answers as 
opposed  to  true  preferences.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  multi-dimensionality  of  the  DCE 
framework also mitigates such tendencies, unless  respondents in reality only make decisions 
based on a specific job characteristic. A robustness check that excludes such individuals will 
be discussed in connection with the results.
There are limitations to how many attributes can be chosen to be able to estimate the 
DCE.  The  results  described  in  the  next  section  show  that  the  chosen  attributes  had  a 
statistically  significant  contribution  to  individuals’  choices.  The incorporation  of  pay was 
considered  necessary,  as  it  was  likely to  be of  fundamental  importance  and necessary to 
15
calculate monetary valuation of other attributes. The attributes and their levels were chosen to 
be relevant and approximately realistic for the state of Uttarakhand and India to a large extent. 
As  mentioned,  it  was  considered  appropriate  to  include  more  than  two  location 
categories.  For instance,  from the perspective of recruitment policy,  it  would be useful to 
know to what extent students prefer to work in their home village or town. An attribute on the 
contract type was also considered important, given the concerns with permanent contracts and 
increased tendency to recruit teachers on a contract basis in India. The existing studies on job 
preferences by public sector workers referred to above have tended to ignore this dimension. 
The attribute levels for the contract types incorporate both geographic rotation12 and 
permanence of the contract. Given the political nature of teacher recruitment and transfers, we 
considered  it  appropriate  to  include  an attribute  on transfer  policies.  Formulating  a  DCE 
question on the topic was challenging, but we wanted to understand how teachers value merit-
based transfers as opposed to ones based on ‘connections and influence’. The final attribute, 
the teacher-pupil ratio, is included as a general indicator of the demand level of the job.
A discrete choice regression model is then used to analyse the relative importance of 
different  attributes  in  choices  and especially,  whether  location  options  significantly affect 
choices. As explained below, the analysis allows one to assess on what terms teachers would 
be willing to trade one job characteristic for another.
12 Rotation and compulsory service in rural areas after graduation have been common practices used for instance 
in the health sector in developing countries (see e.g. WHO, 2006).
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Table 3 DCE: Contract attributes, and their levels
Notes: 1 USD ~ 45 Rupees. The current teacher starting salary in Uttarakhand is 17-18.000 Rs per month (USD 
378-400)
5.1 The model
Following the much used random utility framework (McFadden, 1974), we assume that utility 
from a job contract can be characterised by a function 
(1) U ci=∑
k=1
K
k X cki∑
m=1
M
m Z mi∑
k=1
K
∑
m=1
M
km X cki Z miuci
where contract  c = {A,B} and  i = 1…N refers to individuals.  X is a vector of  K attribute 
levels, and Z is a vector of M personal characteristics. The term uci is random and represents 
unobservable  influences  on individual  choice. Now, the utility  gain from contract  B over 
contract A for individual i, Ui(B), is:
(2) U iB=U Bi−U Ai=∑
k=1
K
k X Bki−X Aki∑
k=1
K
∑
m=1
M
km X Bki−X AkiZ miuBi−uAi
The random component uci may be hypothesised to consist of three additive components: an 
individual specific component vi, a contract specific component ec and a true iid random term
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Pay Location Contract Transfers Staff and pupils
Remote village
Village / Small town Depend on merit
District capital area
Rs. 13000 per 
month
Fixed term 
contract, renewable 
every 7 years. 
Depend on 
connections and 
influence 
2 teachers, 75 
pupils 
Rs. 17000  per 
month
Permanent, must 
transfer every 7 
years. 
2 teachers, 14 
pupils 
Rs. 21000 per 
month
Your home village /
town
Permanent, 
possibility to 
transfer after 7 
years.
ci . Of these, the individual specific term cancels out. The contract specific component can 
be assumed to be zero, unless the respondents have a consistent tendency to be more or less  
likely to respond to contract A instead of B, for instance due to their placement (this will be 
tested below as a robustness check). Suppose the individual chooses contract B if Ui(B) > 0. 
This takes place with the probability
P iB=P [U iB0]=P [∑
k=1
K
k X Bki−X Aki∑
k=1
K
∑
m=1
M
km X Bki−X AkiZ miuBi−uAi0 ]  
(3) = P [u Ai−uBi∑
k=1
K
k  X Bki−X Aki∑
k=1
K
∑
m=1
M
km X Bki−X AkiZ mi ] .
Assuming a distribution for (uAi - uBi), for instance a logistic distribution, the probability in (3) 
can be expressed in terms of a distribution function of a logistic distribution and modelled 
accordingly with Logit:
(4) P iB=F [∑
k=1
K
k X Bki−X Aki∑
k=1
K
∑
m=1
M
km X Bki−X Aki Zmi ] ,
where F(x) = exp(x)/(1+exp(x)). This paper estimates Equation 4 with Logit in all cases, but 
the results are virtually the same if one would use Probit instead. The levels of the contract  
attributes are treated as separate dummy variables in the regression analysis, except for pay 
which enters as a continuous variable with three values. The estimated models are based on 
differenced  contracts  attributes  as  specified  in  Equations  (2)-(3).  Since  the  explanatory 
variables  represent  the  differences  between  the  attribute  levels  of  two  contracts,  it  is 
unnecessary to include individual effects (such as random effects). Appendix 3 describes the 
design of the DCE in more detail.
One downside of a discrete choice experiment is that the interview setting does not 
constitute  a  real,  but  a  stated  choice.  Some  studies  have  been  carried  out  to  assess  the 
reliability of stated preference in predicting actual behaviour, and they tend to show good 
correspondence (e.g.  Adamowicz  et al., 1994).  In the context of health worker preferences, 
Chomitz et  al.  (1998) find a “strong qualitative consistency” between stated and revealed 
preference. Further, the questions can be constructed so as to extract the maximum amount of 
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information from the respondents, and the consistency of the responses can be evaluated in 
some cases (see e.g. Mangham et al., 2008, Street et al., 2005). 
6 Results 
The results of the discrete choice estimations are shown in Table 4. The coefficients in the 
Table  refer  to  the estimated  β:s and  δ:s  of  Model  (1)-(4),  and they measure  whether  the 
attribute levels make respondents more likely to choose contract B. Reference groups (for 
dummy variables) are excluded from the models. For location, the reference group is “Remote 
village”. For the contracts, the reference group is “Fixed term contract, renewable every 7 
years”. For transfers, the base category is “Transfers based on connections and influence”, 
and for pupils and staff, the excluded category is “2 teachers, 75 pupils” (“Large class size”). 
Thus,  the  estimated  parameters  refer  to  preferences  compared  to  these  categories  –  a 
significant  positive  estimated  coefficient  measures  how  much  the  option  is  preferred  in 
relation to the excluded category.  The differences between the preferences of the standard 
students and the para-teachers are measured by the eight interaction terms in Model 1 of 
Table 4. 
6.1 Preferences of standard students versus para-teachers
The basic preference parameters for both standard students and para-teachers are presented in 
the  first  column of  Table  4.  The model  utilises  all  available  data.  So far,  the  estimation 
ignores the observable characteristics of students with the exception of para-teacher status. In 
the framework of equation (3), a para-teacher dummy is the only variable included in Z. 
With the exception of “small class size”, the coefficients for all job attribute levels are 
statistically significant, which implies that they affect choices and are relevant. As the main 
purpose of this study is to assess the differences between the two types of students, focus is 
on the difference between the coefficients for the two groups of students, or the interaction 
terms.
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Table 4 Logit estimates of the DCE model
 **,*,+ : significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Kids = dummy for having children, Exper. = 
teaching experience dummy, Skills = First principal component of skills test, Rural = dummy for rural home 
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[1] [2] [3] [4]
Contract attributes Basic All controls
Pay (1000 Rs) .129 [.008]** .128 [.008]** .139 [.013]** .131 [.022]**
Location: Village / Small Town .573 [.065]** .593 [.067]** .680 [.113]** .703 [.185]**
Location: Home village / town 1.021 [.068]** .995 [.070]** 1.143 [.119]** .918 [.192]**
Location: District capital area .636 [.067]** .646 [.069]** .731 [.117]** .748 [.190]**
Contract: Permanent, with rotation .545 [.047]** .570 [.048]** .532 [.081]** .719 [.133]**
Contract: Permanent .735 [.070]** .739 [.072]** .730 [.121]** .741 [.198]**
Transfers: Based on merit 1.052 [.052]** 1.032 [.054]** 1.023 [.091]** .801 [.148]**
Small class size -.064 [.041] -.071 [.042]+ -.009 [.071] -.156 [.116]
Interaction terms         
-.029 [.012]* -.021 [.013]+ -.013 [.016] -.007 [.018]
-.129 [.104] -.201 [.107]+ -.116 [.136] .027 [.152]
-.455 [.105]** -.432 [.108]** -.333 [.138]* -.055 [.154]
-.574 [.105]** -.630 [.109]** -.551 [.138]** -.236 [.155]
-.058 [.074] -.086 [.076] -.053 [.097] .006 [.108]
-.151 [.108] -.123 [.112] -.093 [.144] .024 [.161]
-.405 [.081]** -.374 [.084]** -.342 [.107]** -.237 [.119]*
-.086 [.064] -.107 [.066] -.068 [.084] -.119 [.095]
-.280 [.085]** -.216 [.090]*
-.206 [.095]* -.168 [.100]+
-.260 [.142]+ -.382 [.146]**
.238 [.098]* .243 [.100]*
-.023 [.014]+
.224 [.116]+
.656 [.120]**
.316 [.119]**
-.269 [.083]**
.276 [.092]**
.231 [.073]**
.014 [.007]+
.202 [.065]**
.207 [.067]**
.146 [.049]**
.250 [.125]*
-.281 [.139]*
-.541 [.144]**
DCE responses 8198 7735 7735 7735
Individuals 685 665 665 665
Basic
Sample [2]-[4]
Life-cycle 
controls
Para × Pay (1000 Rs)
Para × Village / Small Town
Para × Home village / town
Para × District capital area
Para × Permanent, with rotation
Para × Permanent
Para × Based on merit
Para × Small class size
Kids × Permanent, with rotation
Kids × Based on merit
Exper. × Home village / town
Exper. × Permanent, with rotation
Female × Pay (1000 Rs)
Female × Village / Small Town
Female × Home village / town
Female × District capital area
Female × Permanent, with rotation
Female × Based on merit
Female × Small class size
Skills × Pay (1000 Rs)
Skills × Home village / town
Skills × Permanent
Skills × Based on merit
MSc × District capital area
Rural × Village / Small Town
Rural × District capital area
location. To save space, for the additional control variables, only coefficients that are statistically significant are 
reported for models 3 and 4.
From  the  perspective  of  this  study,  possibly  the  most  important  results  relate  to 
preferences over locations.  Both groups regard the “Remote village” as the least desirable 
option. However, the results suggest that para-teachers do not value the “District Capital” 
over the “Remote village” option, which is the reference group. This can be seen by testing 
whether the sum of the estimated coefficients .636-.574 = .063 is significantly different from 
zero,  which it  is  not (p = .44).  At the same time,  while para-teachers value their  “Home 
town/village” significantly more than the “Remote village” (1.021 - .455  ≠ 0, p = .00), the 
preference for “Home village/town” is much stronger for standard students (-.455 ≠ 0, p = .
00) . This observation is somewhat more surprising considering the fact that para-teachers are 
often mothers, or fathers, of a settled family and have been working in their home area. On 
the other hand, the para-teachers may have been selected from less desirable  locations  to 
begin with, and the result could reflect the willingness of some para-teachers to move out 
from their current village/town. They may also simply value change having worked in their 
home village for several years. 
Para-teachers and standard students both clearly prefer a permanent contract over a 
fixed  term contract,  but  the  aversion  of  rotation  is  not  particularly  strong.  In  fact,  para-
teachers  are  indifferent  regarding  whether  the  contract  includes  rotation,  as  long  as  the 
contract is permanent, i.e. (.545-.058)-(.735-.151) is not significantly different from zero (p 
= .34). Standard students on the other hand value a permanent contract without rotation over a 
permanent contract with rotation (.735-.545 ≠ 0, p = .024).
Both  groups  clearly  prefer  jobs  where  transfers  are  based  on  merit  rather  than 
connections  and  influence,  and  this  tendency  is  particularly  strong  among  the  standard 
students. With respect to class size, the standard students are indifferent in terms of whether 
they are placed in a school with 14 or 75 pupils per two teachers. Para-teachers on the other 
hand, actually prefer the larger school (-.064-.086 ≠ 0, p = .003). Our prior assumption was 
that the teachers would prefer smaller schools due to a lighter workload, but it may be that the 
teachers  truly  prefer  more  students  in  order  for  their  work  to  have  a  larger  impact.  An 
alternative explanation is that the respondents associate the larger student body with other job 
features  such as  a  better  school  building  and facilities,  as  these  are  not  specified  in  the 
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alternative contracts. The difference in the number of students between the two levels was 
deliberately large13, but the choices may have been different had the difference been smaller. 
6.2 Explaining the differences
The results of the first model suggest that para-teachers and standard students differ in their 
preferences in some important respects. However, it is important to examine whether these 
differences are of a fundamental nature or simply due to observable differences that become 
less significant over the life cycle. For instance, we know from above that para-teachers have 
considerably more teaching experience, are more likely to be married and have more children 
than the standard students. To what extent would these differences explain the differences in 
preferences?  Is  it  possible  that  in  a  few years,  when  normal  teachers  have  gained  more 
experience, and had more children, the differences in preferences disappear? 
Column  3  of  Table  4  shows  estimates  for  models  that  include  interaction  terms 
between the job attributes and two “life-cycle” variables, dummy variables for whether the 
individuals  have  children  and  teaching  experience.  This  lowers  the  number  of  available 
observations as not everyone reported all the details on characteristics. Interaction terms with 
all contract attributes were included, but the estimated coefficients are only shown when they 
are statistically significant at least at the 10% significance level.
A dummy variable for teaching experience in the private, or public, sector is included 
instead of the actual years of teaching experience, as the correlation of the latter with para-
teacher status is very strong.14 Control variables for age and marital status were not highly 
statistically significant after experience and the dummy for children were included. Column 2 
shows the results of the specification in column 1 with the sample used in columns 3 and 4. 
The changes in the significances of the variables are not large. 
A  comparison  of  the  estimates  in  columns  2  and  3  shows  that  “life-cycle” 
characteristics  explain  the  difference  in  preferences  between  para-teachers  and  standard 
students  only  partly.  This  conclusion  is  based  on  the  observation  that  several  of  the 
coefficients  on the  para-teacher  interaction  terms  still  remain  statistically  significant  after 
controlling  for  life-cycle  factors.  The valuation  of  a  contract  with rotation  as  opposed to 
temporary,  and  a  contract  with  meritocratic  transfers  as  opposed  to  ones  based  on 
13 Based on DISE 2008 data, 10% of two-teacher public sector schools in Uttarakhand have 75 students or more, 
and 10% have 14 students or less. 
14 Care was taken not to include interaction terms that would lead to significant multicollinearity.
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connections,  fall  with children.  Both of  these can be consistent  with the fact  that  having 
children  makes  moving  more  difficult,  and individuals  are  less  interested  in  rotation  and 
transfers,  and thus become more  indifferent  between transfer  options.  Since  para-teachers 
have on average more children, these factors could explain the differences in the preferences 
of para-teachers and standard students, although in this case their contribution does not appear 
to  be particularly large.  The other  life-cycle  factor  examined is  teaching experience.  The 
results show that with experience, teachers are more indifferent between home and a remote 
location,  although  still  prefer  home.  This  can  explain  partly  why para-teachers  are  more 
indifferent between home and remote location than the standard students, possibly because 
they  have  already  taught  in  their  home  location  for  a  long  period.  With  experience,  the 
valuation of a permanent contract with rotation also rises, although adding this control does 
not clearly lead to a large change in the interaction terms for para-teacher status as one moves 
from columns (2) to (3).
The model in column 4 of Table 4 shows the results of a model with interaction terms 
for a larger number of personal characteristics. In addition to the life-cycle variables, all job 
attribute  variables  are  interacted  with a  female  dummy,  the  first  principle  component  for 
skills,  a  dummy variable  for a  Masters  degree and a dummy for  rural  home location.  In 
principle, other interaction terms could have been included as well, but their relevance was 
questionable  in  particular  since  there  is  a  risk  of  significant  multicollinearity  with  an 
increasing number of interaction terms. Given the number of interaction terms, again only 
coefficients that are statistically significant at least at the 10% significance level, are shown.
The results show that the preferences of women differ significantly from those of men. 
However, this is unlikely to explain the differences between the preferences of para-teachers 
and  standard  students,  since  the  gender  balance  is  approximately  equal  in  both  groups. 
Women dislike remote locations more than men. They have a significantly higher preference 
for home location, but also for villages/smaller towns and the district capital as opposed to the 
base category “Remote village”.  This corroborates with our discussions with district  level 
education officials who noted that women are generally less likely to be placed in remote 
locations. In our sample, women also have a stronger preference for a permanent contract 
without rotation as opposed to a permanent contract with rotation or a temporary contract. 
Women value pay slightly less than men, and small class size and meritocratic transfers more. 
An intuitive explanation cannot be provided for all these differences, but given that women 
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generally have less power in the society the preference for transfers based on merit seems 
understandable.
Standard students are more educated and the remaining interaction terms show that a 
Masters degree raises the preference for district capital. A larger share of para-teachers comes 
from rural areas and a rural home location lowers the preference for district capital, or small 
village/town, as opposed to a remote location. The scores of the standard students in the skills  
test are on average higher than those of para-teachers. A higher score raises the preference for 
higher  pay,  home  location,  the  preference  for  a  permanent  contract  without  rotation  and 
meritocratic transfers. 
After all of the different characteristics are controlled for, most of the coefficients for 
the  para-teacher  interaction  terms  become  statistically  insignificant.  The  exception  is  the 
remaining significantly lower preference of para-teachers for meritocratic transfers. This may 
be  explained  by  the  features  of  the  selection  process  for  the  para-teachers.  Thus,  the 
differences  in the preferences  of para-teachers  and standard students  appear  to  be largely 
explained by observable characteristic.  Differences in teaching experience and family size 
appear to explain some of the differences. However, rural origin, skills and qualifications also 
play a clear role in explaining why para-teachers and standard students on average differ in 
their preferences over job contracts. 
6.3 Monetary valuations
Finally, the results show that both groups clearly appreciate higher pay and that this tendency 
is somewhat stronger for standard students. In the model, pay has been measured in thousands 
of rupees. An additional benefit of estimating the ‘preference for money’ is that it allows us to 
compute  the monetary equivalents  of different  job characteristics,  based on the  estimated 
utility impacts of the contract features.
At this point it is important to be clear about the assumptions underlying the estimates. 
Since the utility function is assumed to be linear, the estimates assume perfect substitutability 
between contract attributes. While this is a simplification, it allows for simple comparisons of 
contract features. For example, in the case of standard students, an additional 1000 rupees per 
month increases utility on average by .129, and being located in the district capital instead of 
a remote village increases utility by .636. These figures suggest that 1000×(.636/.129) = 4930 
rupees per month would be the amount that would make a teacher equally content with a 
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remote village as with a district capital, assuming that all other job features are similar. One 
must note, that the figures are estimated from the entire sample of standard students, and there 
may be considerable individual differences in how either money, or specific locations, are 
valued. 
Table 5 Valuations of job attribute levels  per month in relation to base category 
(rupees)
Notes: 1 USD ~ 45 Rupees. Standard errors in brackets. Calculated from the precise coefficients (not rounded to 
3 digits as in Table 4). The estimated valuations are expressed in relation to the base categories, which are: (1)  
Location: Remote village, (2) Contract: Fixed term contract, renewable every 7 years, (3) Transfers: Based on 
connections and influence, (4) Pupils and staff: 2 teachers, 75 pupils. 
In Table 5,  the estimated  monetary equivalents  of different  contract  features  have 
been  computed  for  both  normal,  and  para-teachers.  These  sums  can  be  considered  as 
guidelines  on the  monthly  monetary  value  of  generally  more  attractive  job features,  and 
consequently  indicate  how  much  less  could  teachers  be  paid  for  a  job  with  a  specific 
attractive feature. Standard errors are not calculated, but this shows that in monetary terms, 
both types of students value merit-based transfers most, followed by home village location 
and permanent contracts without rotation. 
7 Robustness checks
This section reports on a set of robustness checks regarding the estimations. The first check 
relates to the selection of para-teachers into the training programme. The second one concerns 
consistency checks regarding the  discrete choice experiment.  
Para-teachers  were  selected  mainly  on  the  basis  of  teaching  experience,  but  other 
characteristics,  such  as  education,  potentially  also  mattered.  Therefore,  there  may  be  a 
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Standard students Para-teachers
Location: Village / Small Town 4430[580]   4407[926]
Location: Home village / town 7896[482]   5624[670]
Location: District capital area 4922[564]     623[809]
Contract: Permanent, with rotation 4212[486]   4836[826]
Contract: Permanent 5683[476]   5793[728]
Transfers: Based on merit 8138[422]   6429[590]
Pupils and staff: 2 teachers, 14 pupils -494[326] -1492[558]
concern that the para-teachers who were selected to the training programme and are included 
in our sample, do not represent well the population of para-teachers in the Uttarakhand state. 
To investigate  this  further,  we compare the characteristics  of para-teachers  in our sample 
(Table 2) with the characteristics of para-teachers in the Uttarakhand state on average. The 
data on the latter are obtained from the District Information System on Education (DISE), 
which is a register database and by now covers well public sector primary schools across 
India. However, it only includes a limited number of teacher characteristics. 
Overall, with respect to age and gender, the para-teachers in the survey sample do not 
differ from the para-teachers in the state as a whole. In the survey sample, the average birth 
year  of  para-teachers  is  1977.7  (Table  2),  implying  that  in  2010,  para-teachers  were  on 
average 32 years old. The 2008-2009 DISE data suggest (Table 6) that the average age of 
para-teachers in government primary schools is 31.2. In the survey sample, 50% of the para-
teachers are women and all hold a university degree. In the state as a whole 44% are women 
and 82% have degrees. Thus,  it  appears that education has been a factor in the selection 
process to the training programme, but the differences with respect to age and gender are very 
minor.
Table 6 Average characteristics of regular and para-teachers currently employed in 
government primary schools in Uttarakhand
Notes: Source: DISE 2008-2009. The number of observations vary by variable due to missing observations
Table 7 below reports the results of a number of estimations, which can be compared 
with the main results, originally shown in column 1 of Table 4, but also replicated in Column 
1  of  Table  7.  If  for  any  reason,  for  instance  due  to  the  order  of  placement  on  the 
questionnaire, respondents would have a tendency to choose the A option in the DCE either 
with higher, or lower, probability, the results could be biased. This can be easily tested by 
including a constant in the model. Model 1 in Table 7 shows that a constant is not statistically 
significant and does not affect the results. 
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Normal teachers Para-teachers
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
Age 58375 40.53 10.48 4143 31.15 6.16
Female 60168 .46 .50 4214 .44 .50
Graduate 59889 .78 .41 4212 .82 .38
Table 7 Robustness checks of the DCE Model
 **,*,+ : significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
One potential  disadvantage of discrete choice experiments in relation to contingent 
valuation is the cognitive complexity of the task for the respondents. It is possible that to 
simplify the task, some respondents use rules of thumb, such as lexicographic ordering, to 
make their choices (Hanley et al., 2001). Model 2 in Table 7 excludes a subset of respondents 
for whom we find lexicographic preferences, i.e. that they always prefer a certain contract 
attribute.  This  could  also  reflect  strategic  behaviour.  As  documented  in  Appendix  3,  the 
tendency  to  exhibit  such  a  preference  is  strongest  regarding  the  “merit-based  transfers” 
option; 57 respondents always choose a contract with this attribute when it's an option. Strict 
preferences for other attributes were much less frequent. Lancsar and Louviere (2006) argue 
against  deleting  respondents  with lexicographic  preferences,  since theoretically,  a  random 
utility model may be able to cope with such preferences, and information is being lost. In our 
case,  the  estimates  remain  qualitatively  very  similar  when individuals  with  lexicographic 
preferences are removed from the sample.
There  may  also  be  a  concern  that  the  fact  that  para-teachers  have  more  teaching 
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[1] [2] [3] [4]
Base model
Contract attributes
Pay (1000 Rs) .129 [.008]** .122 [.009]** .138 [.008]** .115 [.012]**
Location: Village / Small Town .573 [.065]** .507 [.077]** .649 [.070]** .461 [.100]**
Location: Home village / town 1.021 [.068]** .993 [.070]** 1.141 [.076]** .800 [.102]**
Location: District capital area .636 [.067]** .564 [.081]** .715 [.072]** .520 [.103]**
Contract: Permanent, with rotation .545 [.047]** .546 [.047]** .639 [.050]** .710 [.071]**
Contract: Permanent .735 [.070]** .710 [.072]** .820 [.077]** .792 [.107]**
Transfers: Based on merit 1.052 [.052]** 1.034 [.054]** .923 [.057]** 1.133 [.080]**
Small class size -.064 [.041] -.085 [.043]* -.019 [.044] -.108 [.063]+
Interaction terms      
-.029 [.012]* -.029 [.012]* -.034 [.013]** -.013 [.015]
-.129 [.104] -.125 [.104] -.145 [.110] -.022 [.131]
-.455 [.105]** -.455 [.105]** -.513 [.113]** -.217 [.132]
-.574 [.105]** -.573 [.105]** -.608 [.112]** -.451 [.134]**
-.058 [.074] -.057 [.074] -.081 [.079] -.198 [.094]*
-.151 [.108] -.157 [.109] -.181 [.116] -.156 [.138]
-.405 [.081]** -.406 [.081]** -.344 [.087]** -.485 [.104]**
-.086 [.064] -.082 [.065] -.135 [.068]* -.069 [.082]
Constant -.063 [.040]
Observations 8198 8198 7190 5053
Constant 
included
Excluding 
lexicographic 
Teaching 
experience>1
Para × Pay (1000 Rs)
Para × Village / Small Town
Para × Home village / town
Para × District capital area
Para × Permanent, with rotation
Para × Permanent
Para × Based on merit
Para × Small class size
experience significantly alters  their  job preferences.  The regression models  do control for 
experience to an extent (Models 3-4, Table 4), but Model 3 in Table 7 is a direct attempt to 
address  the  issue,  by  only  including  students  who  have  at  least  one  year  of  teaching 
experience. This selection should exclude some of those standard students who have the most 
naïve perceptions  about  teaching as a  profession,  and affect  the results  accordingly.  Two 
minor differences in results may be worth pointing out. Firstly, the valuation of the Home 
village/town location for declines for standard students to an extent. Secondly, the valuation 
of a permanent contract with rotation increases among standard students to such extent that 
the difference to para-teachers becomes significant. As already speculated, it is possible that 
teaching experience,  which  has probably taken place  in  their  home town,  makes  teachers 
value occasional change in location. 
There  may be  a  concern  that  the  mountainous  nature  of  Uttarakhand makes  it  an 
unrepresentative state in India and that this may affect the results, especially with respect to 
how different geographic locations are valued. This is addressed in Table 8, which shows the 
results  of  estimates  for  the  basic  model  with  separate  sub-samples  for  lowland  districts 
(Haridwar, Dehradun, Udham Singh Nagar) and hill districts (Rudraprayag, Chamoli, Almora, 
Nainital).  The   consistency  of  results  across  the  sub-samples  is  surprisingly  strong.  If 
anything, it appears that in the lowlands, which are geographically more representative of 
India in general, standard students are more averse to remote locations as evidenced by larger 
coefficients  for the  alternatives.  Overall,  the differences  between the preferences  of para-
teachers  and  standard  students  are  more  pronounced,  suggesting  a  starker  trade-off  in 
preferences, and possibly motivation. 
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Table 8 DCE Estimates, lowland versus mountain districts
Notes:  **,*,+ : significant at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels respectively.  Lowland districts are Haridwar, 
Dehradun and Udham Singh Nagar. Mountain districts are Rudraprayag, Chamoli, Almora, and Nainital.
8 Conclusions
Attracting qualified public  sector workers to remote locations is a universal  challenge for 
developing,  as  well  as  many  developed  countries.  One  common  policy  with  respect  to 
teachers,  growing in importance in  India and elsewhere,  is  to  hire educated locals  to  run 
schools in remote places on a contract basis, even if their selection may be based on less 
stringent criteria.
The use of para-teachers has remained controversial in India, and little is still known 
about  their  relative  effectiveness,  motivation  and  skills  with  respect  to  regular,  trained 
teachers. The few existing studies on the effects of these teachers on pupil outcomes suggest 
that current para-teachers in schools do not under-perform, and can even outperform existing 
regular teachers. Some studies also find that para-teachers are absent less often. However, this 
evidence  is  still  limited  and  there  is  little  firm  evidence  on  possible  reasons  for  these 
differences.
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[1] [2]
Contract attributes
.141 .123
Location: Village / Small Town .687 .488
Location: Home village / town 1.374 .792
Location: District capital area .784 .532
Contract: Permanent, with rotation.564 .531
Contract: Permanent .908 .640
Transfers: Based on merit 1.133 1.010
Small class size -.093 -.039
Interaction terms    
-.036 -.025
-.172 -.101
-.684 -.324
-.606 -.564
-.176 .037
-.382 -.009
-.485 -.361
-.099 -.076
Constant
Observations 3583 4615
Lowland 
districts
Mountain 
districts
Pay (1000 Rs) [.012]** [.010]**
[.100]** [.086]**
[.113]** [.086]**
[.105]** [.088]**
[.072]** [.062]**
[.115]** [.089]**
[.083]** [.068]**
[.063] [.054]
Para × Pay (1000 Rs) [.019]+ [.016]
Para × Village / Small Town [.158] [.139]
Para × Home village / town [.165]** [.137]*
Para × District capital area [.161]** [.140]**
Para × Permanent, with rotation [.113] [.099]
Para × Permanent [.169]* [.143]
Para × Based on merit [.125]** [.108]**
Para × Small class size [.098] [.086]
By carrying out a Discrete Choice Experiment relating to job preferences and testing 
for skills, this study offers a new perspective to the differences between para-teachers and 
regular teachers and their potential effectiveness. The measurement of both preferences and 
skills is bound to be controversial and dependent on assumptions, but they are both likely to 
be of significance for policy formulation.
In  the  Discrete  Choice  Experiment,  respondents  are  repeatedly  presented  with 
alternative job  contracts with different levels of job attributes, and are asked to choose the 
ones they prefer. Following a random utility framework common to modelling of discrete 
choice,  the  responses  are  explained  with  a  Logit  model,  and  the  estimated  parameters 
interpreted  as  marginal  contributions  of  the  contract  attribute  levels  to  the  utility  of 
respondents. 
The study reveals significant differences both in the job preferences, as well as skills, 
of para-teachers and competitively selected students bound for a  career  in teaching. With 
respect to preferences, a key difference that stands out relates to preferred location.  Para-
teachers  do  not  value  the  district  capital  any more  than  a  remote  village  as  a  place  of 
employment, whereas the standard students value the district capital significantly more. Both 
types of students have a strong preference to work in their home village, or town, in relation 
to all other options, but this preference is weaker for para-teachers. In short, para-teachers, 
who almost all come from rural areas, prefer rural areas in general and standard teachers less 
so.  Higher  pay and a  permanent  contract  are  valued significantly by both.  However,  the 
standard students value pay somewhat more and as opposed to para-teachers, have a stronger 
preference for permanent contracts without rotation as opposed to permanent contracts with 
rotation. Whereas standard students are indifferent with respect to class size, para-teachers 
actually prefer larger class size. Some, but not much of the differences can be explained by 
“life-cycle” factors in which the two groups tend to differ, namely years of experience and 
numbers of children.  Instead, differences in home location, education and skills appear to 
explain the bulk of the differences in the preferences between the two groups.
In  terms  of  our  primary  skills  measure,  para-teachers  perform  on  average  0.74 
standard deviations worse than the standard students selected in a competitive written test. 
This is a large difference. The differences between the two groups were particularly apparent 
in  arithmetic  computations.  This finding corresponds with results  from the SchoolTELLS 
survey, which measured teachers’ subject skills in relation to the expected level required from 
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the students (see e.g. Banerji and Kingdon, 2010). 
A key implication  of  the results  is  that  the  use of  local  para-teachers  is  likely to 
include a considerable trade-off between general skills and the willingness and motivation to 
work in a more remote location. On the other hand, the variation in skills was broad in both 
groups. Whether, and to what extent, the differences in these skills translate into better, or 
worse, teaching at  the primary level  may be difficult  to assess,  but it  is  unlikely that the 
differences are irrelevant.
As a counterbalance to lower skills on average, para-teachers have preferences that 
might help them adapt better to more difficult locations. Individuals who enter the teaching 
profession from rural areas as contract teachers on average differ from individuals who are 
selected via examinations to gain a public sector job. Our findings on preferences suggest that 
para-teachers are likely to be more motivated in remote and disadvantaged areas, on contracts 
that may involve rotation between locations and possibly even with large class sizes. They 
may therefore be more  content  with the type  of  employment  available  on average  in  the 
public  primary school system in Uttarakhand,  and around India.  The DISE data for 2008 
show that 94% of public sector primary schools in India are in rural locations.
The results suggest that the traditional route of hiring individuals competitively for 
permanent civil service jobs may not succeed in attracting individuals who have an inclination 
towards the social-service nature of primary education in large parts of India. A few of the 
existing  studies  on  the  effects  of  contract  teachers  suggest  that  their  impact  is  to  reduce 
inequalities in performance. This may reflect their own experiences of growing up in remote 
areas. One recent piece of research that stresses the role that connectedness plays in student 
attainment  is  by Rawal  and Kindgon (2010),  who show that  in  Bihar  and Uttar  Pradesh 
students do better when taught by a teacher who shares their gender, religion and caste. 
The stark trade-off between skills and preferences observed in this study, points to a 
few possible policy solutions, the success of which may vary depending on circumstances:
1. If recruitment were to rely entirely on regular teachers selected through competitive 
examinations,  compensatory  payment  might  raise  the  attractiveness  of  remote  areas.  Our 
estimates suggest that a standard student should be paid approximately 5,000 rupees more per 
month to induce him, or her, to voluntarily take up a position in a remote village as opposed 
to a position in the district capital. However, given that in Uttarakhand the starting salary of 
primary school teachers is approximately 18,000 rupees, this is a significant amount. 
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2. Further decentralisation in hiring. Currently in Uttarakhand, teachers hired to work 
in  a  particular  district,  have to  be residents  of  that  district.  Typically  all  districts  have  a 
(desirable)  urban centre,  and large  (undesirable)  rural  areas.  A further  decentralisation  in 
hiring could improve the geographic match of teachers, but could also lead to lower average 
skill levels, unless the screening of skills in hiring is improved.
3. If the recruitment of para-teachers would continue, the results suggest a need for 
upgrading skills of such teachers. If effective, training may improve the general skill level of 
para-teachers and narrow the trade-off between skills and preferences. However, it is possible 
that improved skills alter preferences. Whilst the recruitment of para-teachers would be more 
cost-effective, and might allow for more teachers, it is politically sensitive. 
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Appendix 1 Data collection
The research team visited the teacher training centres (DIETs) of 7 districts out of 13 in the 
state in May 2010 (see Figure A1). 120 survey questionnaires were printed for each school 
with the aim of randomly sampling 50% of both standard students and para-teachers from 
each district, or having roughly 50 para-teachers and 50 standard students from each district. 
Table A1 shows the final sample sizes, and how the randomisation of students was carried 
out.
Figure A1 Sampled districts of Uttarakhand
                       
Notes:  The  sampled  districts  are  shaded.  (1)  Haridwar,  (2)  Dehradun,  (3)  Tehri  Garhwal  ,  (4)  Tehri,  (5)  
Uttarkashi, (6) Rudraprayag, (7) Chamoli, (8) Bageshwar, (9) Almora, (10) Nainital, (11) Udham Singh Nagar, 
(12) Champawat, (13) Pithoragarh. Map source: Wikimedia Commons. GNU Free Documentation Licence.
District Information System Data (DISE)
Data on schools or teachers of Uttarakhand referred to, was obtained from the DISE 2008-
2009 database. The data was provided by National University of Educational Planning and 
Administration in Delhi (NUEPA).  
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Table A1 Sample size and notes on data collection
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Sample sizes
Randomisation Notes on conditions
Almora 43 49 Chairs, but no tables.
Chamoli 62 56
Dehradun 51 41
Haridwar 63 43 Chairs, but no tables.
Nainital 50 47 Chairs and tables.
86 0 Chairs, but no tables.
71 42 Chairs and tables.
Total 426 278
 District
Standard 
students
Para- 
teachers
50% of both groups randomised
from student register.
Questionnaires distributed in 
classrooms in random fashion.
Standard students had 
chairs, no tables. Para-
teachers sat on the 
floor.
50% of both groups randomised
from student register.
Most students had 
chairs and tables, some 
just chairs.
50% of both groups randomised by staff, 
criteria unknown.
50% of both groups randomised by staff, 
criteria unknown.
Rudraprayag 
All standard students present were
included. Only 8 para-teachers enrolled in 
the school, and thus not covered.
Udham 
Singh Nagar
All standard students present were
included, and half  of para-teachers covered 
(one randomly selected classroom out of 
two).
Appendix 2 Skills tests
As part of the survey, the teacher students filled a three-part timed skills test. The parts are 
referred to here as Countries, English and Arithmetic. The test was designed so that it would 
not consume much time and would be easy to implement in different conditions, fast to mark, 
and  would  leave  as  little  room  as  possible  for  cheating.  Questionnaires  were  bilingual 
(English+Hindi), and instructions were given in English and Hindi prior to each skill test.  
In the ‘Countries’ test, the students had to write down as many countries as they could 
in 90 seconds. They could use any language they wished, and most used Hindi, while some 
used English. The students were not told that they should write down the names of countries 
prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  test,  but  simply  “items  from an  announced  category”.  An 
example using animals was given. The scoring of the test was based on the number of items 
written  down,  regardless  of whether  they were real  countries  or not.15 The average score 
across 704 responses was 16.03, with a standard deviation of 4.4 and a range of 3 to 33. The 
'Countries' test would be classified in research literature as a test of semantic fluency. The 
origins of such a test can be  traced to Thurstone’s Word Fluency Test for verbal ability 
(Thurstone,  1938).  It  may be  useful  in  examination  of,  for  example,  language,  executive 
functioning, and speed of information processing. It has been found that education and age 
have an impact on the number of items written down, whereas gender usually has only a small 
effect (Ratcliff  et al. 1998). In our context, this can be seen as a test of general knowledge, 
verbal skills, and a proxy for the quality of education.
In  the  'English'  test,  the  students  had  to  first  write  down as  many English  words 
beginning with an “F” as they could in 60 seconds, and next, as many beginning with an “S” 
as they could in 60 seconds. The scoring was based on the average number of proper nouns 
for the two letters,  allowing for minor  spelling mistakes.  Numbers only up to 10 (‘Four’, 
‘Five’,  ‘Six’,  ‘Seven’)  were  accepted.  The  correlation  between the  two sets  of  produced 
words  was  0.74  across  702  respondents.  The  average  combined  score  was  9.96  with  a 
standard deviation of 3.82. Further details are shown in Table A2 below. The 'English' test has 
a similar origin as the 'Countries' test as a measure of verbal fluency, but it is typically applied 
to people in their native language. As in our case virtually all respondents are native Hindi 
speakers, the tests serve as an ad-hoc test for English vocabulary (for discussion on mono- 
and bilingual respondents, see Rosselli et al. 2002).
Table A2 Scores for the English vocabulary tests.
Notes: Correlation of F and S scores is 0.7364, with 702 observations. 
The  'Arithmetic'  test  consisted  of  40  calculations  based  on  addition,  subtraction, 
multiplication  and division,  at  an  increasing  order  of  difficulty.  The problems  should  be 
relatively easy for a person who is familiar with and seasoned in arithmetic computations, 
such as primary school teachers. The respondents were given 4 minutes to answer as many as 
15 This scoring method was based on convenience of not having to go through hundreds of responses in two 
languages. Based on responses given in English, this does not appear to be a concern – only a few respondents 
gave occasional responses that were not actual countries, such as “Rome” or “Taliban”. 
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 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
English-F 702 10.28 3.9 0 24
English-S 704 9.62 4.29 0 24
Average 702 9.96 3.82 0 22
they could. They were not allowed to use a calculator, but could use scrap paper and a pen to 
perform the calculations. The average number of solved calculations for 696 responses was 
27.71 with a standard deviation of 8.64. The scores ranged from 3 to 40. 16 respondents 
achieved the full score of 40.
Table A3 Summary scores of the three skills components
Table A4 Correlations over the skills measures (obs=694)
A principal  component  analysis  of the skill  measures  was carried out.  The first  principal 
component was constructed and normalised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one. This is the primary measure of skills used in the paper.
Table A5 Correlation of the 1st principal component with the tests
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 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Countries 704 16.04 4.4 3 33
English 702 9.96 3.82 0 22
Arithmetic 696 27.71 8.64 3 40
Countries English
English .40
Arithmetic .47 .51
Subtest  Correlation with 1st PC
Arithmetic .83
English .80
Countries .77
Appendix 3 Design of the Discrete Choice Experiment
In this study the job contracts have five attributes, and the attributes have two to four levels as 
follows:  a) Pay: 0 - “Rs. 13000 per month”, 1 - “Rs. 17000  per month”, 2 - “Rs. 21000 per 
month”.  b) Location: 0 - “Remote village”,  1 -  “Village / Small  town”, 2 - “Your home 
village / town”, 3 - “District capital area”. c) Contract: 0 - “Fixed term contract, renewable 
every 7 years”, 1 - “Permanent, must transfer every 7 years,2  -  “Permanent,  possibility  to 
transfer after 7 years”. d) Transfers: 0 - “Depend on connections and influence”, 1 - “Depend 
on merit”. e) Staff and pupils: 0 - “2 teachers, 14 pupils”, 1 - “2 teachers, 75 pupils”.
These attributes and levels were chosen after consulting a number of academics and 
policy makers in Delhi, as well as officials in states of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and 
Punjab, many of whom were former teachers.
Thus, there are total of 144 possible contracts arising from combinations {a0,a1,a2} × 
{b0,b1,b2,b3}  × {c0,c1,c2}  × {d0,d1}  × {e0,e1}.  Further,  there are  a  total  of (144×144-
144)/2 = 10296 possible contract pair comparisons.
Out of the 10296 possible contract pairs, 12 pairs were selected using the principles 
from the literature on DCEs. Mangham et al. (2008) provide a practical primer, whereas a 
good theoretical starting point is Street, Burgess and Louviere (2005).
Out of the 144 possible contracts (full factorial), a fractional factorial of 24 contracts 
is first selected. This is a sub-group for which the levels of attributes are orthogonal. These 24 
contracts  are  shown  in  Table  A6.  An  orthogonal  fractional  factorisation  guarantees  two 
desirable properties for the DCE: Orthogonality – attributes of the design are independent of 
each other,  and level  balance – that  each attribute  level  appears in the design with equal 
likelihood (Mangham et al., 2008).
Combining the 24 contracts into 12 pairs randomly should produce unbiased estimates 
of the β and δ  parameters in equation 4. However, random pairing is likely to produce a 
design  with  low  efficiency,  or  larger  than  necessary  standard  errors  for  the  estimated 
parameters. 
Table A6 Orthogonal 24-fractional factorial. Contract number and attribute levels.
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Contract number Attributes Contract number Attributes
 a b c d e  a b c d e
1 0 0 1 0 0 13 0 2 1 0 0
2 0 0 1 1 1 14 0 2 1 1 1
3 1 0 0 1 1 15 1 2 0 1 1
4 1 0 2 0 0 16 1 2 2 0 0
5 2 0 0 0 1 17 2 2 0 0 1
6 2 0 2 1 0 18 2 2 2 1 0
7 0 1 0 1 0 19 0 3 0 1 0
8 0 1 2 0 1 20 0 3 2 0 1
9 1 1 0 0 0 21 1 3 0 0 0
10 1 1 2 1 1 22 1 3 2 1 1
11 2 1 1 1 0 23 2 3 1 1 0
12 2 1 1 0 1 24 2 3 1 0 1
To improve the efficiency of the estimates,  two further  principles  can be applied: 
Minimal overlap and utility balance (Huber and Zwerina, 1996). The former states that more 
information can be inferred with a DCE if the levels of attributes within a choice set are 
different  (in  our  case  between  contracts  A  and  B).  The  latter  principle  states  that  the 
efficiency can be improved by using some prior assumptions about the true parameters, and 
setting the choices within the choice set to have similar overall utility. It has also been argued 
that the techniques for improving the efficiency may not be very important as sample size can 
substitute for an inefficient experimental design (Lusk and Norwood, 2005). 
In this study, 12 contract pairs (choice sets) were selected from the 24 contracts using 
an  improvised  ‘Monte  Carlo’  type  approach:  The  24  contracts  were  combined  into  12 
matched pairs repeatedly by an algorithm that attempted to minimise the overlap of attribute 
levels between pairs. A set of the resulting “low-overlap” pairings (i.e. different sets of 12 
pairs) was used to simulate choices for 500 respondents with identical utility functions but 
individual error terms (corresponding to the random utility model).16  These choices were then 
predicted with a Logit model, and the precision of the estimates was evaluated (the larger the 
determinant of the information matrix, the more precise).
The process led us to choose the following set of contract number pairings (Contract 
A, Contract B): (16,5), (9,1), (24,7), (15,6), (10,17), (12,19), (22,18), (21,2), (4,14), (11,20), 
(3,13), (23,8). Table A7 below shows the actual choices of the respondents. There were no 
pairs (choice sets) for which a certain option would have always been preferred (either only 
A, or only B).
Table A7 Frequency of choices in the DCE
We have tested for lexicographic preferences, and found that there were seven respondents 
who always chose the contract with higher pay, four who always chose the contract with the 
remotest  place,  four  who always  chose the contract  with the  least  remote  place,  57 who 
always based their chose on merit-based transfers, four who always chose the contract with 
small class size, and eight who always chose the contract with large class size. Further, there 
were three respondents who always chose the 'A' contract, and one who always chose 'B', 
which signals a very small number of clearly inconsistent choices. 
16 It  was assumed that each level improvement within an attribute increases the utility by the same amount  
compared to the lower level (with reference to Equation 4, fixed term contract gets β=1, permanent with rotation 
gets β=2, Permanent without rotation β=3 and so on). 
43
(A,B) Choose A Choose B Non-response % Non-resp.
(16,5) 514 172 21 3.1
(9,1) 426 259 22 3.2
(24,7) 421 267 19 2.8
(15,6) 300 390 17 2.5
(10,17) 484 202 21 3.1
(12,19) 427 259 21 3.1
(22,18) 176 511 20 2.9
(21,2) 258 424 25 3.7
(4,14) 204 476 27 4.0
(11,20) 601 82 24 3.5
(3,13) 315 362 30 4.4
(23,8) 566 114 27 4.0
Appendix 4 Further Information
Figure A2 Distribution the test scores and the 1st principal component.
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Figure A3 Test for Arithmetic
Notes: The actual size of the test was A4.
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Figure A4 Sample page of the DCE 
Notes: The actual size of the page was A4.
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How Uttarakhand differs from other Indian States
It is of interest whether the relationship between normal and para-teachers  in Uttarakhand is 
typical or atypical in the context of India. Below, Figure A5 displays how normal and para-
teachers differ in terms of education, age and gender by district and the proportion of para-
teachers in the district's primary schools. It is recognised that the definition of a para-teacher 
varies somewhat per state and that the figures relate to teachers currently in the field, whereas 
our sample covers teachers early in their careers.
Figure A5. The differences in education, age and gender between normal teachers and 
para-teachers across Indian districts
Notes: Source: DISE 2008-09 teacher database. Circles refer to districts of Uttarakhand and the dots to other  
Indian districts.  The X-axis displays  the proportion of primary school teachers  that  are para-teachers  in the 
district. The Y-axis displays the difference in the average characteristics between the two teacher types in each  
district (for example, in the middle figure, 10 would imply that permanent teachers are on average 10 years older  
than para-teachers). The line depicts an OLS regression line of Y on X.
The first panel of Figure A5 shows that in general, the larger the share of para-teachers 
in  state  primary  schools,  the  more  educated  the  normal  teachers  are  in  relation  to  para-
teachers. The line in the figure is an OLS regression line for the two variables. The second 
panel shows that the more para-teachers the district uses, the younger the para-teachers tend to 
be in relation to normal teachers. Finally, the last panel suggests that para-teachers are more 
often female, and increasingly so if larger proportion of the district's teachers are para-teacher. 
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Although, in the last case, the correlation between the variables in weaker than in the first two 
panels. 
In Figure A5, all 13 districts of Uttarakhand are denoted with circles, instead of dots. 
As discussed earlier,  approximately 8% of Uttarakhand's primary school teachers are para-
teachers, which is fairly 'middle-of-the-pack' figure for India as a whole. The variation in the 
differences  between  the  characteristics  of  para  and  regular  teachers  across  Uttarakhand's 
districts  is  fairly large,  as evidenced by Figure A5. Overall,  one can safely conclude that 
Uttarakhand is by no means an outlier state in relation to how much it has relied on para-
teachers and how much its para-teachers differ from regular teachers within the districts.
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